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SHIRLEY MOYES, on behalf of 
H, JACK MOYES, deceased, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, SECOND INJURY FUND and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19236 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a review of a final Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying petitioner, H. Jack Moyes, workmen's 
compensation benefits. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE BODY 
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the 
Adminstrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order denying petitioner's request for permanent partial 
disability benefits on the grounds that the industrial accident 
did not create additional permanent partial disability. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to review, 
reverse and/or remand the Order of the Industrial Commission 0' 
Utah for the purpose of awarding permanent partial disability 
>~ -~·~ 01~~loy~r and its insurance carrier to the 
•1 1·0 ,. '.; 1-eJth, a:1d for the further purpose of 
I· 11 _;~_· ,,,,i lnjur'! Fund benefits and other benefits as the 
-'"''"' ~:i; h<>·;,? accruc,d before the date of death. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner H. Jack Moyes was a sixty-year-old 
self-taught accountant c,mployed by the Utah State Department of 
Finance.
1 
Mr. Moyes experienced the following series of 
industrial injuries to his lower back over a period of 12 years 
precedin3 the date, of his industrial injury. 
(a) In 1967, Mr. Moyes injured his lower back 
during the course of his employment with Ibeck Motor Truck 
»;hi le changing a tire (R.2). Nine days following this reported 
Jccident (R.26), Mr. Moy9s was hospitalized for six days, 
3uring which ti~e he responded well and rapidly to treatment 
IR. 16 3) • 
(b) In 1973, while in the employment of the Utah 
State Department of Finance, Mr. Moyes again injured his lower 
bac~ when he slipped on som'2 water while walking out of a 
restroom at his employer's office (R.24, 62). The petitioner 
was admitted to the hospital approximately one week following 
•he industrial injury and was discharged nine days later with 
'''n~ the aooeal of this matter, Mr. Moyes died of causes 
"·te'..1~ed t) the industrial injury, on or about October 1, 
lSd3. Shirley Moyes, the wife of the decedent, was substituted 
~~~ pur?ose of this appeal. 
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(c) In 1976, also durin3 the course Jt his 
) ~ F l n d n c •; , "-1 r • .,, , , , 
once more injured his lower back frum liftirq 1 d•'~K (R.LJ~ 1 • 
For this injury, Mr. Moyes was pa1 l temporary total 
compensation for one week and five days in June 1979, two years 
after the date of the alleged injury (R.13l(a)). 
(d) Finally, on November 5, 1979, due ing the cours~ 
of his employment with the Utah State Department of Finance, 
Mr. Moyes suffered an injury to his lower back when he fell 
down some steps at the State Capitol Building (R.15, 16). This 
injury is the subject of Mr. Moyes' industrial application and 
this appeal. Mr. Moyes missed occasional days at work due to 
back pain (R.16, 17), the pain progressed, and on December 8, 
1979, Mr. Moyes' orthopedic surgeon recommended hospitalization 
and possible surgery (R.17). On January 7, 1979, a myelogram 
procedure revealed a large herniated disk in the lower back 
(R.19). Surgery was performed the following day to remove the 
herniated disk material (R.19) and a second surgery was 
required in December 1980 (R.20). Persistent pain and 
debilitation necessitated multiple injections and denervation 
procedures (R.20-21), and Mr. Moyes continued to experience 
severe back pain and radiating pain and had been unable to work 
since he was hospitalized in January 1980 (R.31). 
The State Insurance Fund paid temporary total 
disability compensation to Mr. Moyes for the period January 
1980 to September 24, 1981, ~nd also paid medical bills 
associated with the surgeries per for'Tled ( R. 22). 
-3-
'> 
~allowing termination of the temporary total 
03~~ 0 nts for the November 5, 1979 industrial injury, 
?~titioned the Industrial Commission of Utah for a 
a t 'J to delermine the amount of permanent partial disability 
,,~0~1ated with the industrial injury. The State Insurance 
fdncl responded to this petition by denying liability for 
:ontinced compensation on the basis that the Moyes application 
inadvertently stated that the date of injury was May 5, 1979 
instead of the actual date of November 5, 1979 (R.4). As Mr. 
Moyes did not sustain an injury on May 5, 1979, the Fund had no 
record of such injury date and accordingly denied liability. 
This clerical error was corrected on the record at the initial 
hearing for compensation (R.11). The State Fund further 
replied that Mr. Moyes had incurred prior back injuries and 
responded that any permanent disability related directly to the 
non-industrial injury of 1965 (R.5-6). At the hearing, Mr. 
Moyes established his prior history of industrially-related 
~ack injuries as well as the medical and surgical procedures 
necessitated as a result of these injuries (R.8-42). It was 
clarified that although Mr. Moyes was involved in a 1965 
non-industrial accident, that accident injured his neck, not 
1i.s lower back (R. 27). 
Subsequent to the hearing, the Adrninstrative Law 
i,1~e referred Mr. Moyes to a medical panel for evaluation and 
::'co:ne>r.t of his medical condition (R.44). Dr. Frank Dituri, 
soeci1list i:-i internal medicine (R.57), and Dr. Edward C. 
:o~~cer, 1:-i orthopedic surgeon, were appointed to the panel. 
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The panel was directed to respon,j tu s9,ocific ·'JU'e'>ti ;n_; 
propounded by the Administrat i11,e L,e·• J: 1 l'' tn t"r'"'' -if 
"reasonable medical probability" (R.J~, 
medical panel concluded: 
(a) That the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to Mr. Moyes' "previously-existing 
conditions" is 76% of the whole man (R.117); 
(b) That the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the industrial accident of November 
5, 1979 is 0%; and 
(c) That the permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the lumbar spine is the result of long years of 
chronic degenerative disease (R.116). 
The medical panel neither stated nor explained its 
findings in terms of "reasonable medical probability". The 
panel did conclude "there is no medically-demonstrable causal 
connection" between Mr. Moyes' medical problems and the 
industrial accident of November 5, 1979 (R.117). This was 
supported by a statement that the medical panel "[did] not feel 
that the injury in November 1979 for which he did not see a 
doctor and for which he did not take off work caused any 
serious increase in impairment" (R.116). 
Following receipt of the medical panel report, 
objections to the report were timely filed and a hearing was 
held. Dr. Frank Dituri served as the only witness for the 
medical panel who presented the medical panel report into 
evidence subject to cross-examination (<1..63) .. l\t the hearing 
-5-
·ct i·'n; c) ,cr·d ical ;:;anel report, the medical issues were 
! li~.~3~.~~ 6~~~~en Dr. Dituri's conclusions that ~r. 
',~~~ 01c< problems were the result of "long years of 
,1~1~ ie3~nec3ti~e disease 1', rather than caused by acute 
t·1uma related to the industrial accident of November 5, 1979 
:?..77-79i. Dr. Dituri based his finding on a hospital 
admitting history (R. 75) and on a March 12, 1980 letter by one 
~f ~r. Moyes' physicians that stated Mr. Moyes experienced a 
"steady progression of events" probably not precipitated by the 
November industrial injury (R.75). Dr. Dituri did not base his 
finai~gs on medical evidence, to-wit, test reports, X-rays or 
operative and pathological reports (R. 76-77). Dr. Dituri 
fJr':her admitted that the letter of March 12, 1980, upon which 
he relied, was later clarified within nine days by letter of 
~arcn 21, 1980 from the same physician which noted that the 
~ovember industrial injury could have precipitated Mr. Moyes' 
condition (R.138). 
Dr. Robert Morrow, an orthopedic surgeon who 
specializes in spine injuries and who became Mr. Moyes' 
treating physician, offered significant medical testimony 
directly contradicting Dr. Dituri's conclusion that the lower 
~ac• injuries were related to degenerative disease as opposed 
to trauma. Specifically, Dr. Morrow stated: 
(a, There is a medically demonstrable causal 
- ,.0 - f '. 1 ~. c e ': ·~ ~ ce n '\ r . Moyes ' 1 owe r back in j u r i es and the 
,.J,L;trial accident of November 1979 (R.97); 
[bl Mr. Moyes has residual problems relating to 
-6·-
that industrial injury (R.97); 
(c) Mr. ~oy·~.s ·,..;1s r_··:i~· 1·1r1 
result o f the ind us tr i "l i 11 J '11 ) [ i~·-' 
(d) Mr. Moy~s ~35 Jt l~a;~ .1 ~~ p 0 r~Jn~·1t r1rt13 1 
impairment attributable to the ind 1.;tr ial inJury of November 
1979 (R.98); and 
(e) Future medical treatment will be r~quired as a 
result of the November 1979 industrial injury (R.98-99). 
Dr. Morrow's conclusions were based upon competent 
medical evidence, including the results of a myelogram 
procedure performed on Mr. Moyes on January 7, 1980 which 
demonstrated "findings consistent with a left antero-lateral 
herniated nucleus palposus at L-4/L-5 level" (R. 99). The 
operative report of Mr. Moyes' physician was also relied upon 
by Dr. Morrow which noted a "moderately large bulging disk" 
{R.99). Dr. Morrow testified that it was reasonably medically 
probable that the large herniation was caused by the November 
1979 industrial injury, notwithstanding pre-existing 
degenerative disease, because a large herniation of the type 
Mr. Moyes had would "probably not have been going on for a long 
period of time" (R.104), and would not have been caused without 
trauma. At the conclusion of Dr. Morrow's testimony, Dr. 
Dituri was again called to the stand and asked if, in his 
opinion, the industrial accident of November 1979 could 
reasonably have caused the injury as related by Dr. ~orrow. 
The Administrative Law Judge would not allow a response. 
Subsequent to the he3ring on obJections to medical 
-7-
,,, ''''°>ct, :::v• Administrati'le Law Judge made Fin:ling 3 o: 
1c :Jmpensation for the reason that the industrial 
'i1 ~0:: cause any permanent partial disability. In so 
,11n1, the Administrtive Law Judge made no findings or 
:Aplanarion of the medical issues raised, but simply concluded, 
w1tno1t explanation, that the petition should be denied 
R. 18 7) • A timely filed motion for review before the 
Ind,~strial Commission was denied (R.203), resulting in this 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER SHIRLEY MOYES MAY PROSECUTE 
THIS APPEAL FOR BENEFITS WHICH WOULD 
HAVE ACCRUED PRIOR TO DATE OF DEATH. 
A side issue raised since the motion to substitute 
parties was granted by this Honorable Court questions 
?etitioner's right to appeal benefits after the date of death 
Jf H. Jack Moyes. A majority of courts have found claims not 
to be abated where the applicant dies during the hearing 
?rocess. This is so even during appeal where the claim was 
originally denied. Lightle v. Department of Labor, 413 P.2d 
314 (Wash. 1966); Powell v. Deeartment of Labor, 485 P.2d 990 
'"'lash. 1971), ~. 463 P.2d 748 (Wash. App. 1970). 
This claim is necessarily limited to the amount 
-·1:h would ha?e accrued prior to petitioner's date of death 
;n,bs>:r ial .:o,nmission not denied the claim. See Parker 
_.~:trt'll ,:J:nn1;sion, 37 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (Utah 1935), 
'. -;,::·J.:>_:;.;i-: i..1 ?acific States :2ast Iron Pine Co. v. Industrial 
-8-
Commission, 218 P.2d 970 (Utah 1950). In the instan~ ~~tter, 
the sole issue is causaticin of SI .-Jt.31':,;.iir'.'· 'ti,3s it cir·~,.,, 
not associated with the industrial iniury? All other fac~o: 
of an award are known and subm1ttPd. Thus, under these limite·.' 
conditions, the widow or estate should be allowed to continue 
to prosecute this appeal and receive payment accrued prior to 
the injured employee's date of death. See, generally, Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, §58.42, et~·· Vol. 2 (1982). 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARBITRARILY 
DISREGARDED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
PETITIONER'S FAVOR, AND ENTERED FINDINGS 
OF FACT UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Although the Industrial Commission's findings and 
conclusions on questions of fact are not ordinarily subject to 
review, an important exception is made where "the findings of 
fact do not support the award". Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 889 (1981) (construing Utah Code Ann. 
§31-1-84 (2)). 
The Administrative Law Judge, without explanation, 
simply disregarded substantial and material evidence presented 
in petitioner's favor at the hearing on objections to the 
medical panel report. Despite his acknowledgment that 
petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Morrow, was a "very fine 
orthopedic specialist", the Administrative Law Judge ignored 
the treating surgeon's testimony about petitioner's impairment 
and its probable cause. 
The Administrative Law Judge's refusal to believe 
Dr. Morrow is manifestly unreasonable because his testimony is 
-9-
,~1 0n J~contradicted, competent medical evidence, including 
·~;r1c, and an operative report noting "a large 
<< 3 hernia of the type usually associated with 
J _- ! ':: r" tr a 'J :-:iu 4 The refusal to give due weight to this 
=co•tanti3l medical evidence is especially unjust to petitioner 
since Dr. Dituri admitted the medical panel report was not 
b3sed upon co~parable medical evidence. The "Commission cannot 
act arbitrarily and simply ignore competent and credible 
evidence when there is nothing discrediting therein and there 
is no evidence so contrary". Buxton v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 587 P.2d 121, 123 (1978). See Vause v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006 (1965). 
Credible and important medical evidence in 
petitioner's favor was presented without substantial 
contradiction at the hearing on objections to the medical panel 
report. The fact such evidence was totally ignored justifies 
the conclusion that the Commission acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily and unreasonably in disregarding or refusing to 
believe the evidence. Therefore, the Industrial Commission's 
denial of benefits is not supported by the evidence and must be 
rev"=rsed. 
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE COMPELS A FINDING 
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER AS THE ONLY 
REASONABLE FINDING THAT COULD BE MADE, 
AND THE co~~ISSION'S REFUSAL TO DO so 
IS CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY. 
The clear standard for when the Industrial 
c1.:ntssi.')n's Findings of Fact shC>uld be displaced is when: 
-10-
[T]he Commission's findinJ.c· J:·e "1:t•1tro:. ·H 
capricious", or nwhol1·1· 'wi ,,~t 'J.'J.;?" H 
contrary t,-:1 the ".);ie [ ir1e·; i .. 1:--,1~~ ._>)n-- 1 i -
from the evidence" or 'Nit'.1·1ut "anj' s 1 J~ <--1-1':.tJl 
evidence" to support th~m. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Manfredi, ~' 1t S90. See Kincheloe 
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Comoany of Ogden, 656 P.2d ~40, 443 
(1982). The only evidence upon which the Commission relied in 
denying petitioner permanent partial benefits was the 
subjective conclusion of the medical panel that because 
applicant suffered from significant pre-existing injury which 
was in the nature of degenerative disk disease, there was no 
causal connection between the industrial accident of November 
5, 1978 and the subsequent surgery and disability. 
It is the Industrial Commission, rather than the 
medical panel, which has the responsibility of deciding the 
issues in each case. Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co., 424 P.2d 440, 
442 (1967). In deciding issues in workmen's compensation 
proceedings, the Commission's duty is to consider not just the 
medical panel's report, "but also all of the other evidence an0 
to draw whatever inferences and deductions that fairly and 
reasonably could be derived therefrom". IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin, 5 8 4 P • 2 d 8 2 8 , 8 3 0 ( 19 7 8 ) . 
There is no indication in this case that th~ 
Industrial Commission considered all or even any of the 
substantial and largely uncontested evidence in petitioner's 
favor. Instead, it simply adopted the medical panel's 
conclusion. As stated, the medical panel relied heavily upon 
-11-
1~~it~1ng ~istory as w~ll as a letter from an 
:11n which, on its face, ~as speculative, not 
cross-examination and later modified. If these were 
cl" ,~,i: '=.io significant items relied upon by the medical 
pan~l, it is then obvious that the medical panel was attempting 
not to e~aluate and diagnose, but rather to replace its own 
subJective opinion for the determination of the Administrative 
L3w Judge. 
When faced with demonstrable medical evidence, 
to-wit, the myelogram report and pathology, the chairman of the 
medical panel admitted that he did not look at, nor did he 
consider, this piece of evidence at all. When confronted with 
this direct evidence, the chairman of the medical panel was not 
allowed to state his opinion as to whether there was a 
reasonable medical probability that the industrial injury in 
fact caused the subsequent disability. (R.94.) Thus, the 
record reveals that there is no substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion or decision of the Commission. On the other 
hand, as discussed above, the evidence clearly and persuasively 
supports petitioner's claim. 
In a similar case, Powers v. Industrial Commission, 
~ l Ll'Ah 2d 2-~0, 427 P.2d 740 (1967), the Industrial Commission 
a~opt~1, without question, the ~edical panel report and denied 
st3~1~g that the firefighting activities of the 
~, \<dC,C CJ3j not aggravated 3 pre-existing '.leart disease. This 
our• reversed tne decision, first noting that the medical 
~~c0'. report was erroneously based in large part on the fact 
-12-
that the claimant did not consc1lt a Joct'H ''ntii s:·< 
after the incident. Secondly, thAJ stated th3t the 
may not disregard substantiallj uncontra·Jertecl e"i J'"n:o 
supporting a claim that an industrial accident aggravatod a 
pre-existing ailment. See also, Perchelli v. Utah State 
Industrial Commission, 25 Utah 2d 58, 475 P.2d 835 (1970) 
(conclusion unsupported by record). 
As in the Powers case, in the present case the 
medical panel report and Administrative Law Judge's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law rely heavily on the fact that 
petitioner did not immediately report to his doctor, but waited 
over a month until the time of his next appointment. 
Additionally, the Commission adopts the medical panel report 
which unreasonably and arbitrarily ignores credible competent 
evidence which clearly and persuasively supports petitioner's 
claim. Thus, actions of the Commission in adopting without 
question the conclusory medical report, despite substantial 
evidence compelling a finding in favor of petitioner, are 
arbitrary and capricious. 
As this Court has asserted, the right to review 
decisions of the Industrial Commission was not intended to 
provide an "automatic rubber stamp" for Commission actions, 
"rather, it was intended as a safeguard against possible 
arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust actions of the Commission". 
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Coro., 565 P.2d 11-H, 
1146 (1977). Utah statutes provide: 
-13-
The c·J~~i33io~, upon referral of a case to it 
.·; 3~ ~~~1nistrative law judge, or upon a 
~,,t; in cc~icq file·:l with it to review its own 
c J-~r, 1jr 3.0 administrative law judge's 
ipo~Qrnen~3l order, shall review the entire 
· 0 c.~r :l rn2de in said case. (Emphasis added.) 
.tan .~·.Jd~ An'1. §35-1-82.54 (Supp. 1983). 
In this case, the only conclusion which can be 
reasonably drawn from the evidence of the "entire record" is 
that petitioner's industrial accident created additional 
permanent partial disability. Therefore, the Industrial 
~ommission's refusal to so find is contrary to law and reason 
and must be reversed. 
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY 
FAILING TO ADOPT FINDINGS OF FACT. 
There is no controversy in this case that an 
accident occurred or that the applicant was entitled to 
temporary total disability benefits and medical payments. The 
sole issue to be determined by the Industrial Commission was: 
:lid the petitioner suffer an impairment or aggravation to 
?re-existin~ impairments as a result of the industrial 
accident? This is a factual issue which must be determined 
Mased upon proper findings of fact. The Administrative Law 
l•dq' stated in his decision only that after reviewing the 
t~3timnn1 of Dr. Morrow and the medical panel report, the 
\:11ii11i .. tr:iti·::> La·" J·Jd~e adopts the findings of the medical 
'lo f~rth~r expl3~ation was given. As this Court has 
'.~,re'110 i:=.l·/ he:j: 
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Without proper subordinate finclings, it is 
impossible for a reviewing Ct)urt to ~x~rcis0 
its duty of determinin1 whether the ~~m~1ssi0n 
applied a[)prO!=Jria•_e leqal stJnd1r.Jc, to r1n,c1n,1; 
adequately supported by the e'Jidenccc. 
Barney & Sons v. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 9-13, 949 (Utah 
1980). The medical report states: 
We do not feel that the injury of November of 
1979, for which he did not see a doctor and for 
which he did not take off work, caused a 
serious increase in this impairment. (R.186.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the report erroneously relies in great part on the fact 
that petitioner did not immediately consult his doctor. As 
discussed above, whether or not the petitioner immediately 
seeks medical attention is not determinative of a claim for 
compensation for aggravation of pre-existing impairments. 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 742. By simply 
adopting the report of the medical panel which is not competent 
evidence and which admittedly relied upon assumptions rather 
than demontrable medical evidence, the Commission compounded 
not only its "gratuitous assumptions, but also the unfounded 
conclusions that sprang therefrom". Redman Warehousing Corp. 
v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283, 285 
( 1969) • 
Additionally, it must be noted that the head of the 
medical panel and the only member to testify in support of its 
"findings of fact" at the hearing on objections is a specialist 
in internal medicine. Utah workmen's compensation statutes 
specify that a medical panel with qualifications set forth in 
-15-
;. ,J,o ,:>.rl'•· )3';-2-56 (Supp. 1982) should evaluate the 
1 ~~)fC_,,-=:t: ~ -~f the cas~. "The Commission shall appoint an 
•~iic1l panel to consist of one or more physicians 
_2:_~~ L d 1z ing in the treatment of a disease or condition 
inu'l~e3 in the claim." (Emphasis added.) 
Although Dr. Spencer, one member of the medical 
p~nel, is 3n orthopedic surgeon, it is clear that Dr. Dituri 
played a major role in establishing the panel's finding that 
the industrial accident did not create additional partial 
disability. Dr. Dituri's testimony makes it clear that he has 
no expertise or even understanding of back injuries and 
problems relating thereto. Thus, it is in direct conflict with 
petitioner's statutory right that the evaluation by an expert 
in the field if his injury to have a non-expert play such a 
~ajar role which results in denial of significant benefits. 
Petitioner does not argue that the Commission is 
duty bound to accept the testimony of petitioner's witness 
above that of the medical panel witnesses. The Commission 
cannot, however, arbitrarily accept one conclusion over another 
without a finding as to the reasons for adopting one version 
o~er 3nother, especially where the version accepted is not 
s~poorted by competent medical evidence. In such case, it is 
i~po3sible to determine whether the Commission applied 
3poropriate legal standards. 
T2 merely "accept" or "adopt" the panel's finding as 
', ~ '"'", ~he Industrial Commission elevates the panel to 
'1~tf111der and thus encroaches upon its own authority to make 
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findings of fact. TCie> prc1p.:·c '.' :r; J;., l ·, 
limited to medical P;<ainin.1ti-,1 :ini Lo]'l•J_;:o, l~ 
be considered by the C')m:n1s.;inn in arr1v1ng ac ci.~. ~lt::n.1'•: 
decision • Jensen v . Uni t e d S tat es Fu e 1 , ~~, '° t 4 4 1. 
CONCLUSION 
The major factual history presented demonstrates an 
admitted industrial accident followed by two major surgeries; 
payment of significant temporary total disability for 
approximately 20 months; payment of substantial medical 
benefits; significant objective medical findings in the form of 
myelograms and X-rays, as well as actual observable evidence 
demonstrating a traumatic herniation of disk material, not a 
degenerative process. In addition, a medical specialist 
testified, based upon demonstrable medical evidence and to a 
medical certainty, that a permanent partial aggravation 
occurred. 
Against these uncontroverted facts, the Commission 
arbitrarily adopted the unsupported opinion of the medical 
panel, which admittedly did not consider all of the evidence 
and was not allowed to change or clarify its opinion at the 
conclusion of the panel hearing. 
It is accordingly respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission of Utah erred in adopting the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted by the Administrative La~ 
Judge. The Commission's Order denying benefits should be 
reversed and remanded for the purpose of awarding payment of 
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0359L 
1r ''Htiol i;cscHrment benefits to the applicant, H. Jack 
i-1.l 1 i..~ ~.J:"'i'ling ·,.;ijow and/or estate. 
RESPECTFULLY SU3'1ITTED this ,!_st! day of February, 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 533-8383 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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/-( 
following persons on this /"/-day of February, 1984: 
Frank V. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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P. 0. Box 5800 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Susan B. Diana 
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